For the past year or so, ACA proponents have gloated over the fact that markets have not yet collapsed in a death spiral and that enrollment in Exchange plans has grown to 9 million. There are at least four recent developments, however, that suggest the ACA is in greater trouble than many realize.
Enrollments Way Lower Than Projected
The first piece of troubling news comes from CMS itself: Notwithstanding the full implementation of the individual mandate, CMS is projecting anywhere from 9.4 million to 11.4 million people enrolled in the Exchanges, an increase of 3-25% over its figure for 2015. And, while ordinarily growth rates of this nature might please insurers, the projections on the basis of which Obamacare was enacted asserted that 21 million would be in the Exchanges by 2016. Thus, while the Exchanges were running at 70% of original projections in 2015, they are now projected to run at just 45 – 52% of projections for 2016. Moreover, between 0.9 million and 1.5 million of the enrollees for 2016 are projected to come not from the uninsured but from those already holding off-Exchange individual market policies.
The reduced enrollment in the Exchanges has several ramifications. First, it likely means the pool in the Exchanges is less healthy on average than expected. Second it means the significant overhead expended in establishing the Exchanges and running them is spread over a lot fewer people. And third it means that Obamacare was essentially passed on greatly exaggerated assertions of its benefits. Does the extraordinarily elaborate and expensive apparatus is establishes make sense when the a far lower than projected number of people gain health insurance of quality? One also must wonder how the dilution of the individual mandate through various “hardship exemptions” may have lowered the number of people enrolled on the Exchanges.
[[Added 10/20/2015]] For an excellent analysis of this issue, look also at Brian Blase’s recent article in Forbes. (http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/10/19/examining-plummeting-obamacare-enrollment-part-i/)
Footnote 1: CMS is now “unable” to make projections for the SHOP Exchanges. Are we now prepared to call them a bust?
Footnote 2: It is not clear whether the CMS enrollment projections took into account the very substantial gross and net premium that appear to be coming (see below).
More Coops Closing
The second piece of disturbing news is that at least four more coops insuring a significant number of people on the Exchanges are going out of business. They are as follows:
Health Republic Insurance of Oregon (10,000 members; $50 million startup “loan”). By the way, Dawn Bonder, CEO of Health Republic, was quoted in The Oregonian just a month ago as follows: “We are strong and we are sticking to our plan, which has always been slow and steady growth. We’re very financially stable,” Bonder said. “We see a long,healthy life in front of us.”
Colorado HealthOP (83,000 members; $72 million in startup “loans”). According to the Denver Post, this comes after the coop increased its enrollment seven-fold and captured 39% of the market in Colorado by cutting rates in 2015 (notwithstanding losses the year before).
Kentucky Health Cooperative (51,000 members; $146 million in federal loans, with a $65 million “emergency solvency loan” in 2014). Again, this coop managed to capture 75% of the Kentucky Exchange market by offering insurance at lower prices. Before shutting down, it had requested a 25% increase in premiums for 2016. By the way, anyone remember those stories about how Kentucky was the success poster child for the ACA? It looks like its success may have been built primarily by selling insurance at cut-rate prices hoping that most of the losses would be bankrolled by the federal government.
Tennessee Community Health Alliance (27,000 members; $73 million in federal startup loans). How had this coop captured market share? Apparently by charging premiums so low that, as reported by The Tennessean, it had to request a 32% increase for 2016 and was granted/directed — get this — to offer premiums at a 45% higher rate.
Many of the coops blame their failure on the Cromnibus law enacted in December of 2015 that prohibited use of non-appropriated funds to pay for the federal Risk Corridors program that, on paper, was supposed to have the federal government backstop up to 80% of losses. Given the magnitude of insurer losses thus far, the federal government is thus able to pay only 12.6% of the obligations created on paper by this program. If one assumes, however, that the coops are correct in blaming Risk Corridors rather than mismanagement for their failure, this would confirm the suspicions of many that insurers priced their policies deliberately low in order to bring in business, relying on the federal taxpayer to cover their losses. I would also not be surprised to see some sort of legal action relating to coops who, notwithstanding Cromnibus and the handwriting on the wall persisted in booking Risk Corridor receivables at full value until very recently.
There will surely be lots of finger pointing over the failure of these coops: Democrats pointing to the “evil” Cromnibus bill as the source (although many Democrats voted for the legislation) and Republicans pointing to the inherent flaws in the ACA as the root of the problem. In the meantime, however, in many states, one of the sources of lower-priced insurance has been eliminated, meaning that many will be seeing substantial increases in gross premiums.
The fall of the PPO?
One of the promises of the ACA was that it would continue to offer choice to consumers and that they would be able to keep their doctor. Not so in many states. Plans that offer greater degrees of choice in selecting one’s provider appear to be in some trouble, closing in the shadow of an impending adverse selection death spiral. In Florida, for example, zero PPOs will now be available on the Exchanges in 2016. In Texas, the state’s largest insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, has announced that it lost so much money on individual PPO plans that it will no longer sell any in 2016. This development means 367,000 people will have to find other types of plans.In Illinois, Blue Cross is continuing PPOs for now, but only with narrower networks than had been available under a plan that had served 173,000 individuals.
I suspect this is just the beginning of problems for PPOs sold on the individual market in an era when insurers can not medically underwrite. Between 2014 and 2015, PPO premiums went up at a far higher rate than other plan types. We will shortly have the data to see whether this trend continued in 2016.
We don’t have all the information yet, but if ACA proponents like Charles Gaba are correct, we are looking at some substantial gross premium rate hikes in the United States, and extremely high rate hikes in some states. What Mr. Gaba has done is to go state by state through various filings and do what no one else has tried: correlate premium rates with actual enrollments. Although I do not always agree with Mr. Gaba, I must praise him for a very worthy and time consuming enterprise. The fact that some insurer is charging an astronomical premium for insurance doesn’t mean as much when few people are buying their product as it does when an insurer is getting a large share of the business. Unfortunately, the federal government does not publish in any place I can discover insurer-by-insurer breakdowns of enrollment.
The research suggests gross premiums will go up 12.45% nationwide once enrollment weighting is taken into account. Statewide figures range from a high of 41.4% in Minnesota, 39.0% in Alaska, and 30% in Hawaii to lows of 0.7% in Maine, 0.7% in Indiana and 3.5% in Connecticut. Among the bigger states, the estimates are 4% for California, 15.8% for Texas, 9.5% in Florida, and 7% in New York. As I have noted on this blog and in testimony before a Congressional committee, net premium increases — which is what really matters to purchasers — can often be considerably greater than these figures, particularly for poorer individuals, but also can be lower.
More to come
We will, of course, see what plays out. But for those who thought the brilliant engineering of Obamacare had forever slain the adverse selection dragon, beware. Dragon eggs can hatch.
In testimony before Congress last June, I think I may have shocked some Representatives by estimating that insurers selling policies on the individual exchanges as part of the Affordable Care Act would be sufficiently unprofitable that they would get only 37% of what they would have received under the Risk Corridors program had the federal government not required that the budget for that program be balanced. It turns out, however, that my gloomy estimate was, in fact, wrong — but only because it was far too cheery. In fact, according to data released yesterday, insurers will receive only 12.5% of what they thought at one time they would receive. There is a $2.5 billion shortfall between the money taken in under that program from profitable insurers and the money now owed to those who lost money, at least as the government measures it.
The shortfall spells trouble for Obamacare in a number of ways. And it is difficult to overestimate how troubling this development should be for supporters of that program.
Some Exchange insurers are likely in serious trouble
First, it likely means that some of the smaller insurers who, at least before passage of section 227 of the Cromnibus bill last December, had anticipated receiving full payment for the money the government owes under the Risk Corridors program, are going to find themselves with a serious cash flow problem. Some may even find themselves with solvency problems given the improbability that the full amount of the Risk Corridor obligation will ever be paid. Companies that had booked Risk Corridor payments as receivables valued at 100% of the face amount, may have to start writing off at least part of them off as uncollectable. Thus, when CMS says that the government’s inability to pay 87.5% of what it owes may create “some isolated solvency and liquidity challenges,” that is likely an understatement. Fortunately, as the Wall Street Journal reports, some insurers apparently saw the handwriting on the wall and accounted for the Cromnibus limitation properly so as not to deceive shareholders or state regulators.
Bad news for Exchange premiums
Second, it augurs severe pressure on insurance pricing in the healthcare exchanges. The reason that there is a $2.5 billion shortfall is that a lot of insurers lost a lot of money selling policies on the Exchanges during 2014. Insurers, like other businesses, have this habit of trying to make up for past losses by charging more in the future. So we will see later this month some of the effect when the Obama administration releases data on premiums for 2016, but the massive losses in 2014 shown by the Risk Corridors results is likely to add to pricing pressures.
The Obama plan to rescue insurers has failed
Third, it shows that broken promises have consequences. Let’s go through some history here. Remember the infamous promise, “if you like your healthcare plan, you can keep it. Period.”? That was, of course, not exactly true in light of what the statute actually said. And, when Americans saw their policies cancelled as a result, the Obama administration decided it would delay and relax enforcement of the various provisions of the ACA that would have killed enough many non-Exchange insurance plans.
But this refusal to salvage the political rhetoric by sacrificing the language of the statute got many insurers angry. The insurershad priced their policies on the assumption that of course the Obama promise was the usual political moonshine and that those healthy insureds previously owning now non-compliant policies would migrate their way over to Exchange policies and stabilize that market. In true Cat in the Hat Comes Back style, the Obama administration “solved” that problem, as I explained twice (here and here) in December of 2013, by fiddling with the accounting rules in the Risk Corridors program by making it more difficult for insurers to be deemed to have made sufficient money to owe the government and making it easier for insurers to be deemed to have lost money and thus be owed money by the government. (Although its pronouncements were a bit cryptic, as I noted last April, the CBO may have estimated that the cost of this gimmick was as much as $8 billion). Now, however, with the Cromnibus bill prohibiting the Obama administration from dipping into unspecified accounts to pay for Risk Corridors, which I guess is what they planned since no money was ever appropriated for the program, that last bit of multi-billion tinkering has backfired. Insurers will not be paid for Risk Corridors for a long time if ever and, thus, they have indeed suffered a significant loss of a chain of make-it-up-as-you-go-along policies designed to salvage the ACA.
Don’t trust government accounting
Fourth, the Risk Corridors deficit exposes as pure bunkum the statements of many in Washington in the post ACA era — and continuing even today — about the state of the insurance market and the Risk Corridors program. Recall that at one point not too long ago the CBO was asserting that the Risk Corridors would actually make the government $8 billion. This was done, perhaps not coincidentally, after an effort by Senator Marco Rubio gained prominence to defund Risk Corridors as an insurance industry bailout. Devoted readers may also recall that I found the CBO’s estimate “baffling,” a bit of cynicism whose sagacity may have improved with age. And even today with the announcement, officials at CMS repeated the technically correct and yet practically dubious notion that, yes, there were shortfalls today, but Risk Corridor payments made by insurers in 2015 and 2016 might be enough not just to overcome the 2014 deficit now valued at $2.5 billion but also to make whole insurers who lost money in 2015 and 2016.
And the plea to undo Cromnibus
It is no wonder that former CMS head administrator Marilynn Tavener, now speaking for the America’s Health Insurance Plans, is now saying it is “essential that Congress and CMS act to ensure the program works as designed and consumers are protected.” By “as designed, Ms. Tavenner means before Cromnibus when Congress, in a spasm of fiscal responsibility, required that Risk Corridors, for which no money was ever appropriated, actually pay for itself just like the Risk Adjustment program. Translation of Ms. Tavenner: find someone else’s money somewhere to bail out insurers who lost money in the Exchanges.
Many have been concerned that the architecture of health insurance without medical underwriting created by the Affordable Care Act was inherently unstable and that, sooner or later, the markets it created would contract due to serious adverse selection problems. Although various creative bolsters from the Obama administration have delayed that forecast from yet materializing, except perhaps for the most generous of ACA exchange plans, as it turns out, the more immediate threat to Obamacare may come not from its inherent architectural deficiencies but from technical flaws now being unearthed by program detractors.
One of these flaws has been much in the news: the failure of the premium tax credits section of the ACA (section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code) to extend to policies sold in states that did not establish an exchange pursuant to section 1311 of the Act. There are approximately 34 such states. In 2014, they covered about two-thirds of those enrolled in individual health plans through the Exchanges. The Supreme Court is likely to decide this term in King v. Burwell whether the Obama administration’s determination to extend tax credits to persons in those 34 states is lawful. A decision against the Obama administration, which appears to be the prevailing prognostication, will throw major parts of the ACA into turmoil because only the sicker insureds with incomes that now qualify them for policies are likely to purchase those policies at full freight. Insurers, knowing of that proclivity, are going to be very leery of selling such policies; adverse selection would seem inevitable. It remains to be seen whether legislative action at the federal level — revision of section 1311 of the ACA — or at the state level — grudging creation of exchanges — would return those markets to equilibrium following a decision expected by many in King v. Burwell.
Another flaw, however, has not received much attention — until late. It is the apparent failure of Congress directly to appropriate money for another critical part of Obamacare that keeps premiums low: the cost sharing subsidies created by section 1412 of the law and now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071. The idea of this provision is that poorer purchasers can purchase a policy for “Silver” prices that ordinarily would have 30% cost sharing, but receive a policy that provides anywhere from “Silver plus” (27%) to “Platinum-plus” (6%) levels of cost sharing. This way, lower-middle-class people can get a policy that they might be able to afford without much of its purpose being undone by hefty deductibles and copays.
For the reasons I outline below, it appears clear that Congress at least strongly contemplated that provision of these extra benefits to the poor would come not from higher prices for policies paid by wealthier purchasers on the individual exchange. Instead, the federal treasury would pay the insurers for the extra costs they incurred in offering these more generous variants of the policy. It appears that the Obama administration has been making such payments to insurers, even if the amount of the payments — potentially in the billions — has not been made clear. (see 3:29:36 of this CSPAN video and the comments of CMS administrator Marilyn Tavenner).
In the lawsuit captioned United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, however, filed November 21, 2014, the plaintiff demonstrates with some care how Congress never actually appropriated any money for the cost sharing subsidies that sweeten Obamacare coverage. Presumably, insurers should thus have to cover themselves the resulting extra expenses created by higher utilization and lower deductibles and copay. Presumably insurers should do so out of revenues they receive from customers paying the full price. Gross premiums for everyone would thus need to be higher: probably 10-15% higher to cover the shortfall. And if insurers neglected to take those extra expenses into account, well, tough on the insurers one supposes. Such a lack of empathy would not be without recent precedent. Congress just hurt the insurers badly in section 227 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (“Cromnibus”) by apparently cutting off a creative funding arrangement the Obama administration had undertaken to make payments to/bailout the insurance industry through the Risk Corridors subsidy program.
Incomplete funding of Risk Corridors is middling potatos, however, compared to non-funding of cost sharing. I would not be surprised to see an increase of 10-15% in gross premiums result if such cost sharing payments were found unlawful. An increase of (1) 10-15% resulting from the absence of appropriations for cost sharing subsidies, (2) perhaps 3% from whatever premium increases are likely to result from the “Cromnibus” decision not to permit circuitous funding of Risk Corridors deficits and (3) perhaps another 7% from increases in premiums that will result from the ACA-required phaseout of the Transitional Reinsurance provision under which the federal treasury covers insurers for insureds with large losses all adds up to a gloomy future for the Affordable Care Act. And that’s true even if, as its proponents claim, the cost curve is being bent. One reason insurance premiums are as low as they in the Exchanges is that, behind the scenes, the government is heavily subsidizing them in a variety of ways.
This cumulative projected increase can not be dismissed by asserting that the increase in premiums resulting from court-barred federal subsidies would affect only those earning more than 400% of the Federal Poverty Level and thus ineligible for Obamacare subsidies. Yes, it might appear that the net premium for others under section 36B really relates only to their incomes and not to the gross premium for insurance.
But the appearance of a limited effect is misleading in at least two respects. Increases in premiums resulting from court decisions and statutory reductions will matter more broadly. First, the subsidy only covers the cost of the second lowest silver plan in the rating area. The many people wanting a plan more expensive than that — a Silver PPO in many parts of the country or even a Gold or Platinum HMO — will be affected. Indeed, their net premiums will go up by a higher percentage than the increase in the gross premiums because the denominator of the increase calculation will not be the old gross premium but the (smaller) old net premium. Second , to the extent that insurers attempt to compensate for the premium revenue shortfall by raising premiums on employer-sponsored insurance, under Revenue Procedure 2014–37 (page 363), which purports to implement section 36B, such a move would trigger increases in percentages of income that individuals have to pay as the net premium for even the second lowest cost Silver Plan.
So, what’s the answer? We haven’t seen the literal answer in court to the complaint by the House of Representatives and, of course, there’s a very serious issue as to whether this is the kind of dispute that belongs in a court anyway. Bet the house that the Obama administration will raise issues called “standing” and “political question doctrine” in an effort to get the case dismissed. But, if those objections fail, is there an answer to the core of the House of Representative’s complaint on this point?
Congress intended that the federal treasury fund cost sharing
One answer might be that Congress at the time of the ACA’s passage clearly intended that payments for cost sharing reduction come out of the federal treasury and not through insurers charging higher prices. The evidence on this point seems rather compelling. Here is at least some of it.
In discussing premium tax credits and cost sharing reductions, Section 1412(a)(3) of the ACA says that the “The Secretary [of HHS], in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall establish a program under which— the Secretary of the Treasury makes advance payments of such credit or reductions to the issuers of the qualified health plans in order to reduce the premiums payable by individuals eligible for such credit. “
Section 1412(c), captioned “(c) PAYMENT OF PREMIUM TAX CREDITS AND COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS” states in subparagraph (3) “COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS.—The Secretary shall also notify the Secretary of the Treasury and the Exchange under paragraph (1) if an advance payment of the cost-sharing reductions under section 1402 is to be made to the issuer of any qualified health plan with respect to any individual enrolled
in the plan. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make such advance payment at such time and in such amount as the Secretary specifies in the notice. “
Section 1313(a)(6) of the ACA , captioned “APPLICATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT” states: “Payments made by, through, or in connection with an Exchange are subject to the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.) if those payments include any Federal Funds. Compliance with the requirements of this Act concerning eligibility for a health insurance issuer to participate in the Exchange shall be a material condition of an issuer’s entitlement to receive payments, including payments of premium tax credits and
cost-sharing reductions, through the Exchange. ” This provision makes little sense if cost sharing reductions were not paid for by the federal government.
Section 1332 of the ACA addresses the possibility of states getting a waiver from many of the provisions of Title I of the ACA and says that in such event “the Secretary shall provide for an alternative means by which the aggregate amount of such credits or reductions that would have been paid on behalf of participants in the Exchanges established under this title had the State not received such waiver, shall be paid to the State for purposes of implementing the State plan under the waiver. ” Why would the State receive such funds for cost sharing reduction if the ACA did not contemplate that the federal government would already be paying for them?
Section 6055 of the ACA requires issuers of “minimum essential coverage” to provide information on the amount of any cost sharing reductions received. This provision makes no sense if insurers were just supposed to absorb the reductions and pass them on to other customers.
Section 10104(c) of the ACA addresses limits on use of federal funds to pay for abortions. It says no qualified health plan may pay for abortion services with “[a]ny cost-sharing reduction under section 1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (and the amount (if any) of the advance payment of the reduction under section 1412 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).” This prohibition would hardly seem necessary if cost sharing reductions were supposed to be absorbed internally by the insurer.
But perhaps it takes more than intent in a bill
My assumption, however, is that plaintiff House of Representatives will concede that the ACA certainly authorizes payments for cost sharing reductions and may indeed have contemplated that they would be made, but that it takes more than authorization for the executive branch. The House will argue, however, that to actually to make the payments: the Executive branch needs money. And it needs the money to be in the right account via a formal appropriation by Congress. The House will likely cite “The Purpose Statute,” 31. U.S.C. §1301 in support of this assertion. This statute reads: “Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law. ” It will likely also cite 31 U.S.C. §1341(a)(1), the Antideficiency Act in support. It says “An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not make or authorize an obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure of obligation.”
These statutory citations are indeed foreshadowed by several paragraphs on the House complaint during which it recites the requests of HHS for appropriations to pay for Cost Sharing Reductions ($4 billion) and asserts that no such appropriation was ever made. The plaintiff notes that, by contrast, Congress did appropriate funds for the first cousin of Cost Sharing Reductions, advance premium tax credits through a standing appropriation under 31 U.S.C. § 1324 for tax refunds due individuals.
Or maybe not
I would expect two rejoinders to this argument. The first is a technical and statutory one: apparently the Secretary has at one time asserted that appropriations for premium tax credits also covers cost sharing reductions. The second is that any law restricting the executive’s power to spend money in this fashion is itself unconstitutional.
A statutory rejoinder?
Although acceptance of this first statutory argument would avoid the turmoil sure to erupt if cost sharing subsidies are judicially prohibited and the difficulties of constitutional adjudication, it strikes me, at least initially, as a loser. Although premium tax credits have a similar objective to cost sharing reductions, the two programs are not identical. They could operate independently. There are many who are entitled to premium tax credits who are not entitled to cost sharing reductions. If similarity of objective means that funds between programs are transferrable, an awful lot of Congress’ “Power of the Purse” has been evaded.
It’s also possible, however, since we haven’t seen the defendant’s response to the complaint that there’s some more authorization somewhere for the spending. If so, the House of Representatives is going to have egg on its face. I assume, however, that the House wouldn’t have been so foolish to file this lawsuit if it had not its homework carefully and failed to find even a needle-in-a-haystack explicit authorization for the spending.
A constitutional rejoinder
The harder question — and the one that would make House of Representatives v. Burwell a case about far more than the ACA — is the constitutional one. Under what circumstances does the President have authority to spend unappropriated funds? Much ink has been spilled by scholars on this issue over the decades . Tahere are some older Supreme Court cases (Hooe and Sutton and Bradley) that indirectly suggest that the limits created by the predecessors to these statutes are real and permissible. There’s also a thorough review of the then-existing literature by the Clinton-era Department of Justice in a memo of its Office of Legal Counsel from 2001 (2001 WL 36175929). Perhaps more relevant will be two cases which, though not binding on the Supreme Court, will likely have some precedential force.
Consider first Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery Central School District v. United States, 48 F.3d 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1995), a case decided by the Federal Circuit in 1995. It involved a statute, the “Impact Aid Act” designed to help certain categories of schools: (1) “section 237” school districts whose property tax base was reduced by the presence of a lot of non-taxable federal property in the area, (2) school districts that had to educate children of workers on federal property, and (3) school districts that had incurred a substantial increase in the number of attending children. Highland Falls, which sits near the West Point Military Academy, was an example of the first kind of district. It should have received money pursuant to the Impact Aid Act since West Point apparently ate up apparently 50% — and a beautiful 50% at that — of the property in the district . But Congress, instead of allocating a lump sum for all payments to be made under the Impact Aid Act, split up the money with specific appropriation for each of the three categories of hardship it identified. And, apparently, the amount of money allocated to the category against which Highland Falls was claiming was short whereas the amount of money Congress had allocated to two other categories was more complete. So, Highland Falls wanted the Department of Education (DOE) to transfer money from the more fully funded accounts to the one that would benefit it.
The court in Highland Falls refused to direct such a reallocation of appropriated funds. Here’s what it said when DOE declined to do so:
Section 1341(a)(1)(A) makes it clear that an agency may not spend more money for a program than has been appropriated for that program, while § 1532 provides that an agency may use money appropriated for one program to fund another program only when authorized to do so by law. It is undisputed that, in each of the relevant fiscal years, Congress appropriated specific amounts to pay for § 237 entitlements. It also is undisputed that, in each of the relevant fiscal years, in order to fund § 237 entitlements at 100% levels, it would have been necessary for DOE to use money appropriated by Congress for entitlements under other sections of the Act—squarely in contravention of § 1532. The approach DOE followed was consistent with this statutory landscape.
As noted above, in order for DOE to fund § 237 entitlements at 100% in accordance with § 240(c), the agency would have had to transfer money from other sections’ appropriations to fund § 237. If DOE had followed such an approach, it would have been spending more money than Congress had appropriated for § 237 entitlements, in violation of § 1341(a)(1)(A). In addition, it would have been depriving at least one other section’s program of funds expressly appropriated for it by Congress. Put another way, it would have been “raiding” one appropriation account, for example § 238 or § 239, to credit another, § 237, in violation of § 1532.
Now, this is not a square holding on precisely the issue in the House of Representatives current lawsuit. It’s not a case where — as here — the Executive branch undertook a reallocation and someone wanted to challenge it. Nonetheless, the language of Highland Falls is supportive of the House’s point. Having decided, apparently, not to allocate funds for Cost Sharing, the executive branch can’t raid a related fund to help pay for it.
Also relevant will be Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 75 (1988). There an Indian tribe sought money to equalize funding of its schools relative to local schools. There was a federal statute that was supposed to provide such money. But Congress had declined to appropriate funds for this special “set aside.” The tribe asked that money be used from other accounts controlled by the Secretary of the Interior to make the statutory payments. The court upheld the government’s decision not to do so.
The Set–Aside Fund was not funded in fiscal year 1986, the year of plaintiffs’ request. Plaintiffs argue that the Department of Interior could have applied funds from other accounts. However, the Anti–Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) states that a United States officer may not authorize expenditures “exceeding the amount available in an appropriation or fund for expenditure or obligation.” Thus, the officers of the Department of the Interior could not grant the plaintiffs’ request for funding. Penalties for violating the Anti–Deficiency Act are codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1350. The court thus finds that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as funds are not available to satisfy plaintiffs’ claim.
Again, not a case 100% on point, but still one that, at least in dicta, reinforced the House’s claim here that the executive can not dip into one pot of money, even if related and even if efficient, to pay bills for another program. And that is true even if Congress has earlier expressed its intent that such a program be funded.
And there is, on the other hand a case involving a disappointed bidder and military purchases of diced turkey (with gravy) and beef stew: Southern Packaging and Storage Company, Inc. v. United States (D.S.C. 1984). There, a district court found that, although the purchase from a Canadian company violated the “Buy-American” provision of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act there was no violation of the anti-deficiency statute because the amount spent on combat rations — even Canadian-sourced ones — did not exceed the overall Congressional appropriation.
There is, in addition, lots of non-judicial authority on the subject, ranging from death-match law review articles by Professors Sidak (1989 Duke L.J. 1162 (1989)) and Stith, (97 Yale L.J. (1988)), to summaries of the law from the United States General Accountability Office to a memorandum from the Clinton-era Justice Department.
So, there is a lot more to be said on this subject and we have not yet had the benefit of Secretary Burwell’s research and argument. But, at least for now, provided the House can overcome the substantial justiciability questions, it looks like it may have a strong case on the merits. Of course, the House ought, like all of us, to be careful what it wishes for. One wonders what reaction many Americans will have to a House legal victory when they find that they can no longer afford the health insurance they purchased due to what they may well regard as a “technicality.”
Exploring the likely implosion of the Affordable Care Act